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Eliminating Forced Labor in American
Corporations and Their Supply Chain: Existing
Solutions and Failures
Breann Hunt1

I. Introduction
If you’ve ever purchased some of Nestle’s chocolate milk, Nesquik,
you may have been purchasing a product sourced by slave labor.
As the world’s largest food manufacturer,2 Nestle has maintained
its competitive advantage by cutting ethical corners in its sourcing
practices. From Thailand to Africa, the global food manufacturer’s
supply chain is replete with severe human rights violations that have
caused public outrage on multiple occasions.3
Twenty-one million individuals across the globe are victims of
forced labor at any given moment. Included in this statistic are millions of children subjected to “restriction of movement, physical
and sexual violence, intimidation and threats, retention of identity
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documents, withholding of wages, [and] debt bondage.”4Annual
profits of forced labor come to a total of $150 billion USD for American companies per year, spread over a multitude of industries and
global conglomerates.5 Increased consumer production has created
fierce price competition among national corporations, driving subcontractors to resort to illegal and immoral methods to gain labor
contracts. Low prices for consumer goods are often paid by the most
vulnerable populations.
The financial benefit of forced labor creates little incentive for
perpetrators to abandon the practice on moral grounds. The competitive advantage organizations gain from unethical supply chain
practices is a lucrative incentive to continue illegal behavior. Human
rights organizations often present emotional pleas to governments,
corporations, and the general public to demand systematic change,
but these organizations lack the power to attack the global and
widely entrenched issue of forced labor. These third-party efforts,
while laudable in their activism, seek redress in the abstract, as current legal systems are unprepared to litigate on the global stage.
With yearly revenues of $90 billion, Nestle’s profits rival the
GDP of entire nations and possess global influence. In 2005, six
plaintiffs alleged that they were enslaved on [Nestle’s] plantations
and sued Nestle and its parent companies in Doe v. Nestle for aiding and abetting their enslavement.6 Despite public awareness and
pending legal action, Nestle made no change to their supply chain
practices, and in 2015--a full decade after the initial attempt at legal
action--the company admitted to human rights violations in its Asian
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supply chain.7 It should be noted that the 2005 claims were from
victims in Africa, thus highlighting the widespread, global scope
of the company’s behaviors. The lack of legal action likely enabled
Nestle to continue illegally sourcing food products. Nestle has never
faced legal consequences for its role in human rights violations;
instead, the firm released reports as a result of public outcry. However, reports and research can only go so far in moderating the ethics
of billion-dollar companies, particularly when voluntary reporting is
done by the company itself.
The fact remains that illegal and inhumane labor conditions
have persisted despite increasing public awareness of the existence
of forced labor conditions. Watchdogs and whistleblowers have
appealed to public sentiment in an attempt to enforce good behavior
from billion-dollar organizations. However, consumers have been
unable to create meaningful change in an economic market with an
oligopoly or monopoly that restricts buying power. Indeed, the case
of Doe v. Nestle has not caused any meaningful legislation to be
passed and has only recently been appealed to the Supreme Court
for further consideration on behalf of the plaintiff’s claims. The
lack of effective legislation and cries for change in this matter prove
that this issue has gone ignored, preventing a clear legal consensus
from emerging. Supreme Court justices remain divided on the issue,
including the role of the judiciary in the interpretation of existing
laws. In Doe v. Nestle, Justice Brett Kavanaugh claims, “[T]his case
really is a case, I think, about the proper role of the judiciary as
compared to the proper role of Congress here in fleshing out the
Alien Tort Statute.”8 It is past time for the American legal system to
recognize corporate culpability in the regular, egregious violations
rife in global supply chains. The author of this Article will examine
existing legal solutions and their failures, while expanding on Justice
Kavanaugh’s question concerning the expansion of legislation.
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II. Background
Many arguments surrounding the issue of illicit supply chain management often focus on the ethical obligation of the courts to rule
against corporations that fail to protect and manage risk. Ethical
arguments, while often compelling in the eyes of the public, fail to
create a sound legal basis for litigation as seen in court precedent
where most rulings have sided in favor of the corporations. Indeed,
multiple courts have ruled against arguments featuring U.S. law that
try to explicitly outlaw slave labor, citing instead the context of the
original law as being economically motivated as opposed to morally
sanctioned. According to the court in the precedential McKinney v.
U.S. Dept. Treasury case, “the plain language of § 307 (referring to
Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930) will not support an interpretation that it was enacted to afford consumers a legal right or interest
in preventing, for economic, moral, or ethical reasons, the importation of foreign goods produced by forced labor.”9
In recent years, the number of suits brought against American
corporations by international plaintiffs has increased, including
several high-profile cases10 such as Doe v. Nestle mentioned above,
where supply chain violations are the cause of the cited damages.
U.S. Code § 1589 explicitly outlaws slave labor in the United States
while U.S. Code § 1307 prohibits the import of products produced
by such labor, and allows for international plaintiffs to sue American companies. This circumstance appears ripe for litigating supply chain violations, yet slave labor rates are only increasing, and
American companies continually face accusations of illicit supply
chain management. Thus, the author will examine the effectiveness
of various non-governmental and legal statutes and their impact on
eliminating forced labor from American corporations’ supply chains
to prescribe possible redress.
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III. Proof of Claim
A. Limited Grounds for Plaintiffs
As American companies globalize their supply chains, the likelihood of violating international human rights statutes increases.
Global sourcing also creates issues in determining the legitimacy of
plaintiffs’ claims to sue on American soil. Justice Elena Kagan questioned the distinction between corporations and individuals in slave
labor liability upon hearing arguments from Doe v. Nestle. She asks,
“if you could bring a suit against 10 slaveholders, when those 10
slaveholders form a corporation, why can’t you bring a suit against
the corporation?”11 Her words highlight the extent to which corporations are shielded, not only from financial risk, but from moral (and
illegal) violations.
Following a ruling in Jesner v. Arab Bank that limited the
grounds for plaintiffs to sue for forced labor violations, legal scholars Verider and Stephen argue that “private human rights litigation
in federal courts will survive only when plaintiffs either fit within an
existing statute, such as the Torture Victims Protection Act (which
excludes corporate defendants) or the Anti-Terrorism Act (which
only covers injury to U.S. nationals), or can both satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction and find a basis in state or foreign law
for their claims.”12 Essentially, current trends in court rulings move
towards an extremely narrow definition of human rights violations
that leaves plaintiffs struggling to not only seek individual damages,
but also to change a system that continues to perpetuate offences
against the defenseless. Victims of forced labor may lack resources
or access to legal redress, as many live outside of the United States
and have linguistic and financial barriers to initiating legal action. The
increased restriction on the grounds for redress for victims effectively
protects billion-dollar industries from facing accountability for
11
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human rights violations perpetrated in pursuit of profit while making
it nearly impossible to prevent the creation of future victims through
widespread legal action.
B. Protection for Corporations
United States law outlaws corporations and citizens from benefiting
from forced labor.13 Further litigation from the Tariffs Act of 1930
claims that goods produced by convict or forced labor shall not enter
any U.S. port.14 Human rights activists have attempted to argue for
a moral and ethical application of the Tariffs Act to bar consumer
goods produced by slave labor from entering the U.S. market. Several cases15 citing this distinct language argue that the Act justifies
a ruling in favor of forced labor victims. However, the McKinney v.
U.S. Dept Treasury ruling appeals to the context of the Tariffs Act,
which states that “section 307 was enacted by Congress to protect
domestic producers, production, and workers from the unfair competition which would result from the importation of foreign products
produced by forced labor.”16 The California District Court’s interpretation of the Tariff Act of 1930 reinforced the lack of ethical business obligation in supply chain cases. In other cases, such as the
International Rights Fund vs. U.S.,17 plaintiffs cited Section 307 of
the Tariffs Act of 1930 as justification for declaratory and injunctive
relief from multiple United States Government entities for failure to
investigate allegations of forced child labor in cocoa imports from
Côte d’Ivoire. The court in 2005 upheld the decision of McKinney
v. U.S. Dept. Treasury “because of the undisputed facts regarding
the lack of any significant domestic production of cocoa, section
13

Forced Labor, 18 U.S.C §1589 (2008).

14

McKinney v. U.S. Dept. Treasury, 799 F.2d at 1544.

15

McKinney v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Leagle, https://www.leagle.com/
decision/citingcases/19862343799f2d154412108?page=1.

16

McKinney v. U.S. Dept. Treasury, 799 F.2d at 1544.

17

Int’l Labor Rights Fund v. U.S., 391 F.Supp.2d 1370 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2005).

Eliminating Forced Labor in American Corporations and
Their Supply Chain: Existing Solutions and Failures

79

307 essentially renders itself moot under these facts.”18 The court
therefore created a precedent that precludes use of Section 307 in
litigating violations of forced labor when a U.S industry is not at risk
from foreign competition. Essentially, this interpretation protects the
interests of those American corporations that are often the perpetrators of human rights violations on international soil. No such protection for the vulnerable population of forced laborers exists.
However, well-known brands and companies that produce popular products for consumers in the United States like Nike, Microsoft,
and even Walmart have been linked to forced labor upon which they
rely for market success. The nature of subcontracting production and
other labor allows U.S. companies to manage the logistics of selling
goods through overseas supply chains, far distant from the consumers that will actually purchase the products. Thus, “corporations and
manufacturers are not held legally responsible when an outside firm
that is sub-contracted to produce their product uses forced labor.”19
Not only are corporations legally cleared from implications of forced
labor by avoiding responsibility for subcontract labor, but consumers are often unaware of the reality of supply chain morality due
to the distance between production and purchasing. Therefore, corporations can effectively avoid both legal and societal implications
that would arise from aiding and abetting systems of forced labor.
While violating the laws prohibiting the use of forced labor, such
U.S. companies grow larger and more influential, creating economic
monopolies on U.S. markets and barring fair economic competition.
Other firms competing in the U.S. market who are not inclined to
cut ethical corners find themselves at a disadvantage compared to
firms that leverage the lack of information and liability to advance
in market share. Indeed, the power, size, and available markets for
these products allow the overbearing firms to dictate the price and

18

Int’l Labor Rights Fund, 391 F.Supp.2d at 1370.

19

Chrissey Buckley, Forced Labor in the United States: A Contemporary
Problem in Need of a Contemporary Solution, Human Rights & Human
Welfare 116, 117 (2008).

80

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 35, 2021

speed of manufacturing.20 In turn, financial inequality and market
bias abound, harming victims, customers and the free market alike,
though disproportionally.
C. Competition Inequality
Presently, there is no adequate legislation addressing the financial
inequality created in the U.S. market when firms who benefit from
forced labor compete with other firms who uphold lawful labor practices. While legislation such as code 1307 addresses the concept of
forced labor violations, there is no comprehensive legislation that
addresses forced labor victims, customers implicated in the purchase
of goods produced by such victims, and the protection of the free
market from the influence of unethical cost reduction from various
corporations. In the ruling of McKinney v. U.S. Dept of Treasury,
the court addressed the argument of competitive injury in economic
markets based on sourcing from forced labor. Such competitive
injury can be described as price discrimination that distorts economic fairness. The ruling states that, “Article III [of the Constitution] requires more specific allegations of competitive injury to
satisfy the case or controversy requirement.”21 From the conclusion
of this case, it is clear that the court acknowledged the presence of
competitive injury abstractly but required appellants to quantify
injury further to gain a favorable ruling. The author will address and
establish the definition of competitive injury under existing statutes
and prescribe additional measures for promoting free market trade
by penalizing companies engaging in forced labor.

20
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D. Forced Labor and Its Effect on the Free Market and Antitrust
Violations
The federal government of the United States has developed legislation to promote rigorous business competition in the marketplace.
Examples include antitrust laws and SEC requirements which
ensure fair competition and freedom of information in the market
by breaking up market monopolies and issuing property rights. In
relation to supply chain management, antitrust laws enforced by the
FTC examine firms’ supply chains. The FTC claims that, “A vertical [supply chain] arrangement may violate the antitrust laws [...] if
it reduces competition among firms at the same level (say among
retailers or among wholesalers) or prevents new firms from entering the market.”22 Supreme Court precedent dictates that antitrust
issues be examined through a reasonable framework that includes a
consideration of the effect of a firm’s actions on competition within
the market. The FTC claims that, “[price advantage through supply
chain] must be weighed against any reduction in competition from
the restrictions.”23 While price advantage is not illegal, gaining market high ground through forced labor creates an unfair vertical supply chain that tilts economic competition in favor of the company
with human rights violations.
According to the FTC, “a vertical arrangement may violate the
antitrust laws, however, if it reduces competition among firms at the
same level (say among retailers or among wholesalers) or prevents
new firms from entering the market.”24 Sourcing goods through illegal labor reduces competition by unfairly lowering the cost of goods
sold for firms, thus enabling them to undercut competitor pricing.
This does have the effect of reducing the advantages of free market
competition and prevents new firms from entering the market. For
22
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example, a study done on the price increase upon Fair Trade certification of coffee brands (an industry often associated with forced
labor in its supply chains), researchers found that price increases
did not reflect the consumer’s willingness to pay.25 A Fair Trade
certification is a third party supply chain certification that audits
participating businesses to ensure their subcontracted labor is well
paid and free from slave labor.26 The study further claims that, “Fair
Trade Certification has an impact of raising the price of coffee 22%
compared to non-Fair Trade coffees,” while “Fair Trade Certification increases the premium consumers are willing to pay for coffee
by 1.1%.”27 Thus, while brands that secure their supply chains from
human rights violations must necessarily increase their prices, there
is not a corresponding willingness to pay the additional price from
consumers. The study cited deals with a common consumer good,
coffee, where firms compete with similar prices and four brands
represent more than 55% of total market share.28 Other common
consumer goods have similar industry structures, such as Nestle,
where large competitors compete on price for market share. When
industries compete on price, the likelihood of ethical supply chain
efforts creating an effective competitive advantage with the majority
of consumers decreases.
While there is certainly evidence of forced labor within coffee
supply chains,29 ethically sourced coffee brands have not made a significant entrance into the mainstream market. This represents how
25
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26
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dominant, global firms with no legal repercussions for their human
rights violations suppress the expansion of ethically sourced U.S.
competitors. In the Supreme Court filings for Doe v. Nestle, competitors claim that Nestle violated their right to the free market. According to several firms who had taken measures to ethically source their
product, “As slave-free cocoa and chocolate companies, [we] are at a
competitive disadvantage to companies that source cheap cocoa produced with forced child labor. The higher production costs associated with compliance with international human rights norms require
[us] to sell chocolate at higher prices.”30 If other firms are operating
with legally sourced labor, they will be less likely to sustain profits and compete in markets where some firms are illegally benefiting from cheaper labor. Economic scholars Kynak et al. argue that,
“The competitive environment, heating up with the emergence of
new and powerful competitors in the markets with regard to all sectors, tempts entities to perform unethical maneuvers in their commercial relations with the aim of gaining a competitive advantage.”31
Unethical maneuvers to gain competitive advantage in the market
are often hard to detect and costly to investigate. Indeed, “transaction and auditing costs of the entities increase due to the fact that
such operations based on the derivation of unfair advantage are difficult to detect.”32
As mentioned above, becoming a Fair Trade certified brand
requires rigorous standards and will increase the cost to the firm
for goods sold. This includes associated overhead costs. Other certifications for sustainability such as the B Lab, which includes similar standards for labor within the supply chain, represent high costs
30
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to firms who decide to engage in such third-party labels.33 While
these certifications are not necessary for firms to engage in ethical practices, they represent the overall cost disadvantage for firms
that refuse to compromise ethical sourcing standards for price cuts.
Thus, for this reason, national antitrust legislation can define the
federal government’s obligation to address forced labor in supply
chains, and provide additional context in courts for understanding
the quantifiable damage done to free markets by illicit supply chain
management.
E. Current Legislative Efforts in Forced Labor Reduction and
Policing
The United States federal government has a legal obligation to remedy illicit practices in the supply chains of American companies.
However, some may argue that the federal government should not
interfere in free market operations due to volunteer efforts by human
rights organizations and public advocacy groups that have come to
prominence in recent years. Current legal arguments suggest leaving the ethics of human rights violations to the court of public opinion. Logically, if the public can successfully keep businesses from
engaging in forced labor in their supply chain through social pressure, there is little need for government intervention. To this end, it
is necessary to examine existing legislation and its effectiveness in
deterring forced labor as well as voluntary public efforts to reduce
human rights violations committed by American companies. Legislation has been limited in this regard, but recently, attempts to
police the ethicality of supply chains have been instated. The State
of California has attempted to end the practice of forced labor by
enacting the California Transparency in Supply Chain Act of 2010.
A decade after its inception, the California Transparency in Supply
Chain Act has been critiqued by scholars and investors alike. The
declared purpose of the CTSCA is to “help California consumers

33
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make better and more informed purchasing choices.”34 The CTSCA
requires businesses worth over $100 million in California to “disclose on their websites their efforts to eradicate slavery and human
trafficking from [their] direct supply chain for tangible goods offered
for sale.”35 However, the Act “only requires that covered businesses
make the required disclosures, even if they do little or nothing at all
to alter their supply chains.”36 Human rights organizations classify
the CTSCA as “more symbolic than substantive in nature.”37
Despite the lack of enforcement and means of policing, the act
does provide a basis for creating reporting that can be compared
across firms. One common critique of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting is that voluntary reporting is extremely arbitrary
and varies by firm. Legislation such as the CTSCA can standardize
the reporting initiatives, though admittedly, the CTSCA does little to
create meaningful change in companies’ supply chains without the
power to enforce more than reporting statistics. The CTSCA is one
of the most widespread examples of modern supply chain legislation.
To date, no other states have made similar moves to adopt such legislation. Internationally, the United Kingdom has passed the Modern Slavery Act of 2015,38 which includes a supply chain disclosure
clause similar to CTSCA. As of 2021, the United States government
has not passed similar legislation combatting modern slavery.
F. Third-Party Efforts in Forced Labor Reduction and Policing
Voluntary efforts to monitor and improve supply chain human rights
violations by third party organizations currently include researching existing work conditions and possible solutions, but these efforts
34
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do little in the implementation of systematic change. The theory of
change behind third party organizations relies on the assumption
that the public will put pressure on firms if given compelling narratives of workplace conditions. Organizations striving to end forced
labor in supply chains include, but are not limited to, the Fair Labor
Association, Know the Chain, and Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB). These organizations have contributed to a greater
understanding of research techniques to identify how supply chains
exploit workers globally. CHRB reports specifically on the largest
global companies by name and industry. Know the Chain similarly
generates reports for companies and investors to voluntarily elect to
adopt better supply chain practices. In each case, these supply chain
watch dogs are connected to a vast network of other international
rights organizations that promote the UN Sustainable Development
Goals and other priorities geared towards bettering conditions for all
humankind. However, like the results of the California Transparency
in Supply Chain Act, these NGOs struggle to make a concrete and
sustainable impact. Though they are clearly able to find information concerning human rights infringements in global supply chains,
the information only yields value when condemned by courts. In
many ways, these efforts are isolated from legislative efforts, which
reduces their effectiveness.
In sum, the CTSCA and third-party voluntary efforts focus
primarily on reporting yet fall short in implementing real change.
Existing precedent for proving corporate injury has so far been limited. These ineffective efforts to penalize global supply chains who
engage in forced labor de-incentivize investors from progressing,
accepting, and promoting ethical supply chains.39 However, further
development on the issue of ethical supply chain management may
come to fruition in the future. As recently as July 21, 2020, the SlaveFree Business Certification Act was introduced to the United States
Congress. The bill would require reporting of supply chain violations through external audits and certification of slave-free labor.
Ultimately, the bill proposes that “the Secretary may assess punitive damages in an amount of not more than $500,000,000 against a
39
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covered business entity.”40 The proposed Slave-Free Business Certification Act draws on the precedent of the CTSCA by requiring
public disclosure of supply chains. It remains to be seen whether this
approach to legislating supply chains in the United States will have a
similar effect as that of the California Supply Chain Act.

IV. Conclusion
The author proposes that a more direct approach to supply chain violation be adopted in conjunction with the Slave-Free Business Certification Act or in coordination with SEC or FTC regulations. It is clear
that third party organizations have research and analysis capabilities
and methodologies that can be utilized to assess corporate injury.
In order for claims of corporate injury to be sustained in antitrust
regulation cases or SEC information injunctions, the Supreme Court
requires clear proof of injury. In accordance with existing capabilities in supply chain analysis, this article demands that trusted supply
chain organizations include specific metrics relating to competitor
injury. Upon proof of competitor injury, the author argues that antitrust laws should be applied to cases of forced labor within supply
chains, as previously outlined. The author concedes that clear competitor injury must be proven through existing Antitrust definitions
of injury, but argues that in the presence of a multiplicity of NGOs
and ineffective legislation, resources can be reallocated by both governments and third parties to determine the extent of economic damage when firms engage in illegal supply chain practices compared
to legally sourced firms. In this way, human rights violations can be
litigated through existing law, and the diversity of research available
to the public will serve to create a clear path of action for consumers
as well as legal entities charged with upholding existing law.
The author’s findings indicate that issues of illicit supply chain
management are relevant to today’s legal discourse, and that an effective method of incentivizing compliance with national and international human rights standards has not yet been implemented in the
40
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(2020).
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United States. Upon examination of the California Transparency in
Supply Chain Act, this paper concludes that the lack of enforcement
renders this legislation ineffective in changing company practices.
Appeals to public virtue have failed to inspire systematic change
in the global supply chain, as the Act falls short in prescribing penalties for non-compliant firms. Non-governmental organizations
excel in creating research reports and providing statistics on forced
labor conditions; however, the quantity of reports has oversaturated
the market without effecting change. This paper instead proposes
that research organizations focus on proving corporate injury and
instances where free market trade has been dampened by unfair
advantages gained by illegally sourced labor. The author concludes
that the U.S. government has a duty to upholding the free market and
protecting its citizens, and this duty must be carried out in eliminating forced labor from U.S. consumer goods.

